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April 1971] Notes 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SELF-INCRIMINATION-
HARMLESS ERROR-Application of the 
Harmless Error Doctrine to Violations 
of Miranda: The California Experience 
941 
Because it is impossible to make all criminal trials totally free 
from error, all jurisdictions accept the doctrine of harmless error as 
it applies to ordinary evidentiary mistakes committed at trial. All 
fifty states and the federal courts have harmless error statutes or rules. 
Although they vary somewhat, the general theme of these statutes 
and rules is that a defendant's conviction will be reversed only if 
he was prejudiced by the mistake.1 The saving of judicial resources 
is considered an advantage that outweighs the burden put on the 
defendant of arguing that he would not have been convicted in the 
absence of error.2 Difficulties arise, however, when the error com-
mitted at trial involves a violation of the defendant's constitutional 
rights. While the policy of judicial economy still applies, the danger 
of undermining the effectiveness of a constitutional guarantee, by 
treating its violation as harmless error, must be considered. As will 
be discussed, the Supreme Court has fashioned special rules to 
handle this issue of harmless constitutional error.3 
Using decisions of the appeliate courts of California that have 
applied the federal harmless error rule to violations of Miranda v. 
Arizona4 and Escobedo v. lllinois,ri this Note will examine the logic 
and effects of the California application.6 However, the California 
I. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). CALIF. CoNST. art. VI, § 4½ reads: 
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on the ground 
of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, 
or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter 
of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the 
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964) states: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in 
any case, the Court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without 
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
For a short history of the harmless error rule as it applies to constitutional and non-
constitutional errors, see Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83 
(1967). See also J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (lid ed. 1940). 
2. See f!:enerally Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implication of Chap-
man v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1969). 
3. See notes 8·26 infra and accompanying text. 
4. 884 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
6. Many of the cases examined in this Note are post-Escobedo but pre-Miranda. 
However, since the limited Escobedo warnings of the right to counsel and right to 
remain silent as interpreted in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. 
Rptr. 169 (1965), were subsequently incorporated into Miranda, the Escobedo and 
Miranda case~ can be legitimately treated as a single entity. In all these cases, the issue 
under consideration is the same-how did the California courts apply the harmless 
error rule to confessions that were invalid because of some defect in the constitutionally 
required warnings? 
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experience can only be understood by first briefly describing the 
United States Supreme Court's decisions regarding harmless consti-
tutional error and then showing the approaches taken by other 
states in their application of the harmless error rule to Miranda 
violations.7 Not only will this analysis put the California experience 
in its proper perspective, but it will also show the feasibility and 
difficulties of implementing any harmless error rule. 
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR 
Until the 1967 decision of Chapman v. California,8 the Supreme 
Court, with one exception,9 had consistently held that a violation of 
a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial resulted in 
automatic reversal of his conviction and the ordering of a new trial.10 
In Chapman, the Court applied the federal harmless error rule to 
uphold the conviction of the defendants despite adverse comment 
to the jury by the prosecutor concerning the defendant's failure to 
testify. The Court had earlier held that such adverse comment vio-
lated a defendant's right not to be compelled to be a witness against 
himself, as guaranteed by the fifth amendment.11 In cases after Chap-
man, the Court extended the applicability of its harmless error rule 
7. See, e.g., Soolook v. State, 447 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1968); Duckett v. State, 3 Md. App. 
563, 240 A.2d 332 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968); People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157, 242 N.E.2d 830, 
295 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1968); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968). 
8. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
9. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), in which the Court held that evidence 
received in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to be confronted by 
witnesses against him was harmless because of the defendant's own confession of guilt. 
10. In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court rejected the argument 
that a coerced statement by the defendant was not prejudicial in language broad 
enough to require automatic reversal for all improperly introduced evidence. Subse• 
quent to Bram, and until 1967, the Court reversed convictions involving constitutional 
error without even discussing harmless error. Among the grounds for reversal were 
denying the right to trial before an impartial judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
(1927); basing a conviction on an unconstitutional statute, Stromberg v. California, 283 
U.S. 359 (1931); instructing the jury using an unconstitutional presumption, Bollenbach 
v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946); denying counsel at trial or at some other critical 
stage, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 
(1961), Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948), House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945), _ 
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); admitting into evidence a coerced confession, 
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963), 
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), Watts 
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); holding a trial 
in a community where there had been an excess of prejudicial pretrial publicity, 
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); denying a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); discriminating in the selection of grand and petit juries, White 
v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); failing to provide an impartial jury, Parker v. Gladden, 
385 U.S. 363 (1966); trying a defendant who was incompetent to stand trial, Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946), 
the Court implied that when "the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific 
command of Congress," harmless error rules might be inapplicable. 
11. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
April 1971] Notes 943 
to certain violations of the sixth amendment's right to counsel12 and 
confrontation.13 
The Court in Chapman first held that the issue whether a con-
viction could stand when a constitutional right had been violated is 
a federal question to be decided under a federal harmless error rule.14 
The Court attempted to give content to this rule by distinguishing 
between "constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infrac-
tion can never be treated as harmless error"15 and "constitutional 
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant 
and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitu-
tion, be deemed harmless ...• "16 The Court exemplified what it 
meant by basic constitutional rights by citing cases dealing with 
confessions, the right to counsel, and the right to have an impartial 
judge.17 In devising a standard to deal with those errors that in a 
particular case are sufficiently insignificant to be considered harmless, 
the Court referred to the test it had applied in the earlier case of 
Fahy v. Connecticut18 in requiring "the beneficiary of a constitu-
tional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."19 
The Chapman test, directly descended from Fahy, came under 
heavy criticism by commentators as being ambiguous and unworkable, 
and thereby giving little effective guidance to lower federal and state 
courts.20 With these difficulties clearly in mind,21 the Supreme Court 
12. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967). 
13. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See also the concurring opinion of 
Justices Blackmun and Burger in Evans v. Dutton, 400 U.S. 74, 90-93 (1970). 
14. Justice Harlan dissented, maintaining that the federal courts should be con-
cerned only with whether the state harmless error rule comports with the due process 
requirements. 386 U.S. at 51. See also Mause, supra note 2, at 527-37; The Supreme 
Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 208-09 (1967); Note, Constitutional Law-
Judicial Power-Harmless Error, 19 CAsE W. R.Es. L. REv. 157, 160-67 (1967); Note, 
Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83 (1967); Recent Case, 20 VAND. L. 
REv. 1157 (1967). 
15. 386 U.S. at 23. 
16. 386 U.S. at 22. 
17. 386 U.S. at 23. It is difficult to understand why, as in Chapman, freedom from 
intentional adverse comments by the prosecutor, when the defendant is legitimately 
exercising his right against self-incrimination, is not basic to a fair trial and therefore 
subject to the automatic reversal rule. See Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in 
which he advocated a rule of automatic reversal for Griffen violations. He stated: 
The adoption of any harmless error rule ••• commits this Court to a case-by-case 
examination to determine the extent to which we think unconstitutional comment 
on a defendant's failure to testify influenced the outcome of a particular trial. 
This burdensome obligation is one that we here are hardly qualified to discharge. 
386 U.S. at 45. 
18. 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). 
19. 386 U.S. at 24. 
20. Not only is the Court's failure to specify those additional constitutional rights 
that are immune from the harmless error rule confusing, the standard itself is dif-
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in Harrington v. California,22 despite its insistence to the contrary, 
committed itself to the traditional overwhelming-evidence test.23 In 
Harrington, a codefendant's inculpatory confession was introduced 
into evidence against the petitioner in violation of his sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation, as interpreted in Bruton v. United 
States.24 The Court concluded that the case against the petitioner 
was "so overwhelming that unless we say that no violation of Bruton 
can constitute harmless error, we must leave the state conviction 
undisturbed."25 Thus, the focus of inquiry under this test is on the 
amount of untainted evidence rather than on the effect that the 
tainted evidence had on the particular fact finder's decision.26 
II. HARMLESS ERROR AND MIRANDA-THE VARIOUS .APPROACHES 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court determined that in order to 
neutralize the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interroga-
ficult to implement. See, e.g., People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 429 P.2d 606, 60 Cal, 
Rptr. 254 (1967), which also dealt with a Griffin violation. While referring to the 
Chapman test, the majority in Ross relied on the overwhelming-evidence test and ruled 
that the error was harmless, essentially balancing the magnitude of the error against 
the extent of the untainted evidence. In his dissent, Chief Justice Traynor argued that 
the references to Fahy in Chapman "can be explained only on the theory that a sub-
stantial error that might have contributed to the result cannot be deemed harmless 
regardless of how clearly it appears that the jury would have reached the same result 
by an error-free route •••• " 67 Cal. 2d at 85, 429 P .2d at 621, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 269. 
To the Chief Justice, applying Chapman is a two-step process. First, the state must show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would not have been different absent the 
error. If this is demonstrated, then the state must prove that the error did not play a 
substantial part in the jury's verdict, the guide being the magnitude of the error, not 
the amount of untainted evidence. See also L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE&: J. lsRAEL, 
MoDERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 628 (3d ed. 1969); Thompson, Search and Seizure and The 
Myth of Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw., 457, 467 (1967); Note, Harmless Constitu-
tional Error, 83 HARv. L. REv. 819 (1970). 
21. See the oral arguments of Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), in 5 
CRIM. L. REP. 4033 (1969). 
22. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
23. 395 U.S. at 254. An earlier indication of this commitment can be seen in 
Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 596 (1968). 
24. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Court held in Bruton that the introduction of a 
codefendant's confession at a joint trial violated the defendant's sixth amendment 
right to cross-examination. 
25. 395 U.S. at 254. But see Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in which he 
accused the majority of overruling Chapman. As he stated, 
Chapman, then, meant no compromise with the proposition that a conviction 
cannot constitutionally be based to any extent on constitutional error. The Court 
today by shifting the mquiry from whether the constitutional error contributed to 
the conviction to whether the untainted evidence provided "overwhelming" support 
for the conviction puts aside the firm resolve of Chapman and makes that 
com promise. 
395 U.S. at 255. 
26. That the verbal formulation of the harmless error rule is not finally settled is 
indicated by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 
74, 90 (1970), in which he used the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of harmless-
ness, citing to both Chapman and Harrington. 400 U.S. at 93. 
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tions, certain warnings must be given to preserve the accused's fifth 
amendment privilege against self incrimination. 27 The Court ex-
plicitly stated that a primary purpose for requiring the warnings was 
to deter police from using "third-degree" techniques, whether of a 
physical or psychological variety.28 However, even in those cases in 
which such specific coercion was absent, the Court found that cus-
todial interrogation without prior warnings would be per se coer-
cive. 29 One desired effect of this determination was to relieve the 
courts of the time-consuming process of deciding whether the state-
ment was involuntary under traditional due process criteria.80 Basi-
cally, if the warnings are not given, any statement resulting from 
custodial interrogation is necessarily involuntary. 
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether Miranda vio-
lations are subject to the harmless error rule--although it does not 
seem that the Court can avoid deciding that issue indefinitely. Thus, 
while the state courts must follow the federal harmless error 
standard, in the absence of definitive Supreme Court opinions they 
are free to expand the areas in which the standard applies.81 Accord-
ingly, some states do regard violations of Miranda as harmless error.32 
The common approach in most state courts is to divide constitu-
tionally invalid confessions between (1) coerced or involuntary con-
fessions-those in violation of the due process clause and which 
subject a conviction to automatic reversal-and (2) "voluntary" con-
fessions-those inadmissable solely because the Miranda warnings 
have not been given and which therefore make a conviction amena-
ble to an application of the harmless error rule. The inconsistency 
of this approach with the premises underlying Miranda is readily 
apparent: if statements obtained during custodial interrogations 
without the required Miranda warnings are inherently coerced, they 
cannot be termed "voluntary."33 
That the voluntary-involuntary distinction is tenuous is exempli-
fied by the reasoning of the Pennsylvania supreme court in Common-
wealth v. Padgett,84 the case in which that court first applied the 
harmless error doctrine to a Miranda violation. In focusing on the 
27. !184 U.S. at 466. See also L. HALL, Y. K.uosAlt, W. LAFAVE 8: J. IsRAEL, supra note 
20, at 626. 
28. !!84 U.S. at 446-55. 
29. !!84 U.S. at 455-56. 
ll0. 384 U.S. at 457. 
!!l. For example, in addition to applying the harmless error rule to Miranda viola-
tions, the California courts have applied it to violations of Mapp v. Ohio, !!67 U.S. 64!! 
(1961). See People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, !184 P.2d 1001, 3!! Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963), 
cut. denied, !177 U.S. 945 (1964). 
!12. See cases cited in note 7 supra. 
!Ill. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra. 
M. 428 Pa. 229, 2!17 A.2d 209 (1968). 
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effect that a constitutional rule has on the reliability of the guilt-
determining process, the court said, "When contrasted with the 
inherent unreliability of a conviction procured . . . on the basis of 
a coerced confession, a conviction obtained through use of an Esco-
bedo or Miranda violation does not go to the very roots of fact-find-
ing reliability, for such a statement may well be voluntary."35 This 
analysis not only avoids the "inherently coercive" language of 
Miranda, but also fails to take into account the pre-Miranda cases in 
which confessions obtained by objectionable police methods were 
excluded without regard to their trustworthiness. For example, in 
finding the defendant's confession involuntary under traditional due 
process grounds, the Supreme Court in Spano v. New York36 stated: 
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does 
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on 
the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while en-
forcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much en-
dangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be 
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.37 
In deciding whether to apply the harmless error rule, the court 
in Padgett placed great reliance on whether the Supreme Court had 
applied the constitutional right retroactively. The court argued that 
a retroactive application of a particular constitutional right was 
indicative of the Supreme Court's evaluation of the effect of that 
right on the reliability of the fact-finding process.38 The Padgett 
court reasoned that, since the Supreme Court had not applied 
Miranda retroactively,39 the harmless error rule was appropriate. 
That this logic cannot withstand close scrutiny is indicated by 
Harrington, in which the Supreme Court held as harmless error a 
violation of the defendant's right to confrontation as interpreted in 
Bruton40-a decision to which the Court had given retroactive 
effect.41 Thus it seems clear that harmless error and lack of retro-
activity do not always coincide. 
Finally, the Pennsylvania procedure of distinguishing between 
voluntary and involuntary confessions may not accomplish a savings of 
judicial resources, which is the primary justification of the harmless 
error rule. This is so because the Pennsylvania courts must determine 
both whether the statement introduced at trial is inadmissable solely 
on Miranda grounds, and if so, whether it is still "involuntary" 
35. 428 Pa. at 235-36, 237 A.2d at 212. 
36. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
37. 360 U.S. at 320·21. 
38. 428 Pa. at 236, 237 A.2d at 212. 
39. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
40. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text. 
41. See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). 
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under the multi-factor due process analysis that Miranda supposedly 
replaced.{2 Thus, in Pennsylvania, the analysis does not stop once a 
Miranda violation is found, but must continue in order to discover 
whether the traditional due process standard has been violated. If 
the court then deems the statement involuntary on the basis of the 
second step of this analysis, it must order a new trial. If the Penn-
sylvania courts are to be consistent with the last of the pre-Escobedo 
involuntary-confession cases,43 which emphasized deterring the police 
from using illegal or coercive means of interrogation,44 reversals will 
be frequent, with the result that judicial resources will be further 
expended. In contrast, should the courts interpret Miranda viola-
tions to demand automatic reversal, there would be no need for the 
due process analysis; and the trial courts, prosecutors, and police 
would know with certainty that when a statement is obtained and 
used in violation of Miranda, the defendant's conviction will be 
subject to automatic reversal. Not only would this interpretation 
deter the police from violating Miranda, but it would also force the 
trial courts and prosecutors to analyze rigorously any doubtful 
confession. Thus, the protections of Miranda would be assured, and 
the possibility of error would be diminished. 
In an effort to avoid the difficulties of the voluntary-involuntary 
distinction, as exemplified by the approach taken in Pennsylvania, 
the California appellate courts have devised an alternative approach. 
Despite Miranda, which expressly rejected the distinction between 
an admission and a confession,45 the California courts have continued 
to recognize this distinction in applying the harmless error rule to 
Escobedo-Miranda violations. Although the Escobedo-Miranda warn-
ings must be given before either admissions or confessions may be 
admitted at trial, the California courts have held that any defect in 
administering these warnings demands automatic reversal if the 
statement erroneously introduced in evidence was a confession,46 
42. As the California supreme court stated in People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 717, 
441 P.2d 625,626, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 818 (1968): 
A principle objective of that decision [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that 
would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity 
of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, 
bad been employed to secure admissions or confessions. 
See also L. HALL, Y. K.AMlsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. !sRAEL, supra note 20, at 639; Mause, 
supra note 2, at 519. 
43. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
44. 373 U.S. at 519; see also text at note 37 supra. 
45. 384 U.S. at 476-77. 
46. There is one exception to California's rule of automatic reversal of confessions 
obtained without proper Escobedo-Miranda warnings. This is the multiple-confessions 
situation, i.e., where the same defendant has confessed to the same crime a number of 
times. Before this exception can be applied, it must appear that (1) the inadmissible 
confession did not contain details significantly different from the other confessions; (2} 
the prosecution placed no undue emphasis on the erroneously admitted confession; and 
(8) the confessions improperly obtained did not induce those legally obtained-which 
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but that if the statement was an admission, the harmless error rule 
applies. 47 In order to be considered a confession, a statement must 
include every essential element of the alleged crime.48 An admission, 
however, "is but an acknowledgement of some fact or circumstance 
which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which 
only tends toward the ultimate proof of guilt."49 The rationale for 
this distinction is that a confession, but not an admission, constitutes 
such persuasive evidence of guilt that it "operates as a kind of 
evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense,"110 thereby making 
automatic reversal appropriate. 51 
The results of this distinction are illustrated by the case of In re 
Shipp.112 Petitioner had been convicted of a felony-murder charge 
arising out of a robbery, and the principal evidence against him was 
a tape-recorded statement, obtained without the proper Escobedo 
warnings, in which he admitted both the robbery and a connected 
assault which left the victim injured but alive. While the court in 
Shipp classified the statement as a confession to the crime of robbery, 
that court, as well as California courts in subsequent cases,113 inter-
preted it as only an admission to the charge of murder, thereby mak-
ing the statement susceptible to the harmless error rule. 
While California's approach is unique, it deserves careful con-
sideration for several reasons. First, it illustrates the general difficulties 
requires in effect that the legal confession must be the first obtained. The basis for this 
exception is that the presence of these three factors assures that there was a reasonable 
probability that the improperly obtained confession did not contribute to the verdict 
and that therefore the harmless error rule is appropriate. See People v. Valencia, 267 
Cal. App. 2d 620, 73 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1968); People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 
P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965). See also Recent Development, 65 MICH, L. REv. 563 
(1967). See also notes 90-91 infra and accompanying text. 
47. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 71 Cal. 2d 614, 456 P.2d 633, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969); 
People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 401 P.2d 665, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965). 
48. See In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 122, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238 (1967). 
49. In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d I 15, 122, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238 (1967). 
50. People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 730-31, 401 P.2d 665, 673-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 
202 (1965). 
51. See People v. Valencia, 267 Cal. App. 2d 620, 627, 73 Cal. Rptr. 303, 307-08 (1968). 
52. 66 Cal. 2d 721, 427 P.2d 761, 59 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967). 
53. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 32, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967); 
In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d I 15, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967). The California supreme 
court has occasionally acknowleged the difficulties in implementing this distinction. In 
two cases, People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967), and 
People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 32, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967), the court simply 
applied the harmless error rule to the introduction of statements obtained without the 
Escobedo warnings, without determining whether the statement was an admission or a 
confession. By avoiding the distinction, the court was in effect following the practice of 
those states that apply the harmless error rule to all Escobedo-Miranda violations. In 
the two cases referred to-Doherty and Powell-the court found prejudice, and there-
fore the failure to make the distinction did not adversely affect the defendant. Even 
if the statements were in fact confessions, thus making the convictions subject to auto-
matic reversal, the result in both instances would have been the same-the ordering of 
a new trial. 
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that any court must face in deciding whether the harmless error rule 
applies to Miranda violations. Like Pennsylvania, California applies 
the Harrington overwhelming-evidence test to statements obtained 
in disregard of Miranda, the only difference being California's dis-
tinction between admissions and confessions. 54 Once a statement is 
considered an admission, the analytical process in both states is the 
same. Second, because California's courts hold that a confession 
received in violation of Miranda requires that a conviction be auto-
matically reversed, California offers more protection to the Miranda 
guarantees than those states that employ the voluntary-involuntary 
distinction. Thus, if the potentially moderate California practice 
severely restricts the effectiveness of Miranda, a greater restriction 
on its effectiveness can be anticipated from those states that apply the 
harmless error rule to all "voluntary" statements obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda. Third, the primary concern of the California courts, 
even before Harrington and despite th'eir constant references to 
'the Chapman test, has been with the amount of untainted evidence 
presented at trial. 55 As such, the California experience can be viewed 
54. In the area of admissions, it would seem that the California courts should also 
have to make the voluntary-involuntary distinction. In order to avoid making this 
distinction, they would have to apply the harmless error rule to all coerced (in the 
sense of violations of the due process clause) admissions. Such an application would be 
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), in 
which the Court held that if the means of acquiring evidence violates due process 
guarantees, then automatic reversal is appropriate. The Court stated: 
In holding that the Due Process Clause bars police procedure which violates the 
basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime and vitiates a con-
viction based on the fruits of such procedure, we apply the Due Process Clause 
to its historic function of assuring appropriate procedure before liberty is cur-
tailed or life is taken. 
llll8 U.S. at 55. 
With the one exception of People v. Gardner, 266 Cal. App. 2d 19, 71 Cal. Rptr. 568 
(1968), the California appellate courts, when confroPted with an admission obtained 
in violation of Escobedo or Miranda, have avoided the difficulty by simply stating the 
general rule that admissions are subject to the harmless error rule and not recognizing 
any voluntary-involuntary distinction. 
55. See, e.g., People v. Milton, 270 Cal. App. 2d 438, 75 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1969), in 
which the court ruled that the admission obtained after the petitioner had invoked 
his right to silence violated Miranda. But the court did not consider this harmless 
error because the inconsistencies between these admissions and the defendant's subse-
quent testimony at the trial, which was also excluded, were integral parts of the 
prosecution's case and all other evidence was purely circumstantial. See also In re 
Shipp, 66 Cal. 2d 721, 726, 427 P.2d 761, 764, 59 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1967), in which 
the California supreme court found that the failure to advise petitioner of his right to 
counsel or his right to remain silent was prejudicial because "[e]xcept for the tape 
recording (where defendant described in detail how he had robbed and 'restrained' 
the victim], the prosecution did not introduce evidence of a persuasive nature that 
connected Shipp with the crime." People v. Webster, 254 Cal. App. 2d 743, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 476, (1967), in which the court, after ruling that the defendant's admission was 
made without the Escobedo warnings, stated: 
In view of the circumstantial nature of the other rvidence against the defendant, 
the evidence of his statement in which he said that he had choked Mrs. Harley 
[the charge was murder and therefore the statement was classified as an admission] 
was bound to be very damaging to the defendant in the event that the jurors 
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as an indication of the direction in which the state courts will go on 
the issue of harmless error now that the overwhelming-evidence test 
is the law. Finally, not only does California have sufficient case law 
in point, but the high regard accorded its courts gives their decisions 
strong precedential value. Thus, the Supreme Court will no doubt 
consider the California approach seriously when it finally decides 
whether, and in what way, to apply the harmless error rule to 
Miranda. 
III. THE LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA 
A common practice of the California appellate courts is to use 
the harmless error doctrine as a means of avoiding the more difficult 
determination of whether a constitutional error has been committed. 
For example, in People 11. Cox,56 rather than determining the suffi-
ciency of the Miranda warning, a California court of appeals declared 
that, even assuming that the police officer's warnings were inade-
quate, the introduction at trial of the defendant's admission was not 
prejudicial.57 Similarly, in People 11. Williams,58 the California su-
preme court declared that even if the "arguably technically insuffi-
cient" warning did not satisfy the Escobedo requirements, the effect 
of the defendant's statements at most was to impeach his credibility 
believed the testimony of Officer Welch. There is no reason to assume that the 
jurors found that testimony to be incredible. 
254 Cal. App. 2d at 752, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 481. 
The problem with this type of analysis is that the court seems to be implying that 
if there had been stronger untainted evidence against the accused, the error would 
have been harmless. See People v. Talley, 65 Cal. 2d 830, 423 P .2d 564, 56 Cal. Rptr. 492 
(1967), and In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967). It should also 
be noted that the California courts employed a variety of additional methods of 
circumventing Chapman when that decision was the law. For example, the Chapman 
test was expressly misquoted in a line of cases. See, e.g., People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 
204, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1967). See also People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 
444 P.2d 91, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1968), in which the California supreme court, after 
deciding that the petitioner's confessions to crimes with which he was not charged 
were obtained without the proper Escobedo warnings, declared that their introduction 
into evidence for the purposes of establishing a modus operandi was harml= error. 
The court stated what it considered the Chapman test to be: 
That standard "requires reversal if, upon an examination of the entire record, 
it appears reasonably possible that the error might have materially influenced the 
jury in arriving at its verdict, and the error must be considered harmless if the 
likelihood of material influence is not within the realm of reasonable possibility." 
69 Cal. 2d at 252-53, 441 P .2d at 104, 70 Cal. R:ptr. at 432 (emphasis added), quoting 
People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 219-20, 430 P.2d 15, 25, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 465 (1967). 
56. 269 Cal. App. 2d 579, 75 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1969). 
57. See also People v. Blackburn, 261 Cal. App. 2d 554, 67 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1968); 
People v. Ashford, 265 Cal. App. 2d 673, 71 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1968); People v. Ireland, 
270 Cal. App. 2d 522, 70 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1968); People v. Oster, 260 Cal. App. 2d 539, 
67 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1968); People v. Hays, 250 Cal. App. 2d 373, 58 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1967). 
58. 71 Cal. 2d 614, 456 P.2d 633, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969). 
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at trial, and their introduction into evidence was harmless, due to 
other overwhelming evidence of guilt.119 
This avoidance of the constitutional issue is contrary to the 
underlying assumption of Chapman and Harrington that in order to 
apply the harmless error rule, a court must first discover an error.60 
The rule was not intended by the Court to serve as a method of 
avoiding necessary decisions on constitutional issues. As a practical 
matter, the substantive content of the Miranda protections will never 
be adequately developed if the courts are allowed to refrain from 
deciding the tough, but necessary, constitutional issues.61 
Even more important is the way in which the California courts 
have used the overwhelming-evidence test to negate the policies and 
protections of Miranda. The opinion in In re Cline62 illustrates 
this point. In Cline the wounded defendant, who had lost much 
blood and was in a state of shock, was interrogated in a hospital with-
out any prior warnings. Under these circumstances, the defendant 
admitted that he had shot at police deputies. The court interpreted 
this acknowledgment as an admission because it did not indicate that 
the defendant was aware that his targets were police-an essential 
element of the alleged crime.63 The court then decided that since the 
admission "had heavily incriminatory quality,"64 it might have 
motivated the defendant to testify at trial, where he was impeached 
by four prior felony convictions. The court concluded, therefore, 
that the introduction both of the admission and of the prior convic-
tions must be considered errors. However, the court considered them 
harmless errors due to "the massive, immovable, independent evi-
dence of guilt,"65 consisting entirely of the eyewitness accounts of 
two police officers, one of whom was wounded at the time of the 
alleged crime. The court stated: 
Relative to the massive weight of independent proof, Cline's extra-
judicial incrimination was not an evidentiary bombshell but only a 
popgun. Neither his inadmissible statement nor an adverse jury re-
action to his courtroom testimony could damage a case lost beyond 
repair.oo 
Even if one accepts the court's questionable assertion that the 
59. 71 Cal. 2d at 622, 456 P.2d at 637, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 69. 
60. 886 U.S. at 20-21. 
61. For a discussion of the many aspects of Miranda that are still undefined, see 
L. HALL, Y. KAMlsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 533-52. 
62. 255 Cal. App. 2d ll5, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967). 
63. The defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon on a police 
officer, under CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(b) (West 1968). 
64. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 124, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 240. 
65. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 124, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 240. 
66. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 125, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 240. 
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untainted evidence was overwhelming, the fact remains that in 
spite of all this legitimate evidence, the police interrogated a 
wounded man who was not only weak from loss of blood, but also 
was still in a state of shock. In describing the need for the Miranda 
warnings, the Supreme Court in that case pointed to interrogations 
which "trade[s] on the weakness of individuals."67 Surely Cline's 
interrogation should be included within that category. Indeed, the 
police conduct involved there might have been so offensive as to 
violate even the traditional due process involuntary test.68 Yet, the 
court, by mechanically employing the harmless error rule, never 
reached the question whether the admission violated the due process 
requirements. Nor did the court consider the possible unreliability 
of statements elicited from the defendant while he was wounded and 
in shock. Thus, under the guise of avoiding reversal on account of 
inconsequential error, the court not only sterilized the Miranda de-
cision, but also nullified any due process protection outside Miranda. 
Even if intentional bad faith by the police is partially discounted,69 
police practices such as in Cline-which are no more than a careless 
and senseless disregard of the law-are strong-evidence that a rule of 
automatic reversal is needed in order to deter official misfeasance.70 It 
is submitted that to dismiss this type of flagrant disregard of Miranda 
as harmless error would amount indirectly to overruling that decision 
and depriving an accused of his legitimate rights. 
The fact that Cline is not an isolated case is demonstrated by 
People v. Tally,71 in which two brothers were charged with burglary 
and both made extrajudicial statements without having been given 
any warnings by the police. In deciding that one defendant's admis-
sion, in which he declared among other things that "his brother was 
a better burglar," was harmless, the court said: 
Although his inconsistent statements regarding the stolen articles 
found in his home might be viewed as showing a consciousness of 
guilt ... and other of his statements might be viewed as having a 
67. 384 U.S. at 455-57. 
68. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
69. See L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 20, at 444-46, for 
a statement of the position that much of the official misbehavior is indeed intentional. 
See also Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 
1519 (1967). 
70. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518-20 (1963); Kamisar, Betts v. Brady, 
Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
219, 239-40 (1962). Justice Harlan advocated automatic reversal on this type of official 
misbehavior "because society cannot tolerate giving effect to a judgment tainted with 
such intentional misconduct." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 52 n.7 (1967) Oustice 
Harlan, dissenting). 
71. 65 Cal. 2d 830, 423 P .2d 564, 56 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1967). 
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slight tendency to incriminate him, the statements added little to the 
prosecution's strong case against him. 72 
Thus in spite of the complete disregard by the police of their duty 
to give the Escobedo warnings, the court concerned itself only with 
the "slight" incriminatory tendency of the defendant's statements. 
The Tally case, like Cline, illustrates the extent to which the Cali-
fornia courts will go to uphold a conviction by use of the inherently 
subjective overwhelming-evidence rule. A determination whether a 
defendant is entitled to the constitutional protections of Miranda 
that is based on whether the judge characterizes the inadmissible 
statement as "a popgun" or considers it as adding "little to the prose-
cution's case" seriously undermines the defendant's constitutional 
rights under the fifth amendment. 
A final indication of the extent to which some California courts 
will go to avoid a finding of prejudice in situations in which the dic-
tates of Miranda have not been followed is their practice of finding 
harmless error because a defendant's invalid admissions were consis-
tent with his subsequent defense. In People v. Hooper,73 the court 
ruled that the introduction of the defendant's admissions-which 
had been obtained without the Escobedo warnings-was harmless 
error because those admissions were no more than a repetition of the 
defendant's alibi to which he and his witnesses had testified at the 
trial. At no point in its opinion did the court consider the influence 
of the invalid admission on the defendant's decision to use the alibi 
defense or on his decision to take the stand. 
In People v. Alesi,74 the California supreme court at least ac-
knowleged that it would be illogical to rule that the introduction 
into evidence of the invalid admission was harmless error because it 
was consistent with the accused's defense-that he did not make the 
illegal sale-when that defense was in fact influenced by the invalid 
admission.7li The court decided, however, that even if the defense 
presented at trial was influenced by the illegally obtained admission, 
it was the only meaningful defense available and, therefore, the error 
was harmless.76 The practical effect of this analysis, therefore, is that 
after finding that the defense was influenced by the admission, the 
court is required to engage in the questionable and time-consuming 
process of identifying and evaluating all the possible defenses in each 
particular case in order to be sure that the one actually presented by 
the defendant was the only meaningful one available. Furthermore, 
72, 65 Cal. 2d at 840, 423 P.2d at 571-72, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 499-500 (emphasis added). 
73. 250 Cal. App. 2d ll8, 58 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1967). 
74. 67 Cal. 2d 856, 434 P .2d 360, 64 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967). 
75. 67 Cal. 2d at 862, 434 P.2d at 364, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 108. 
76. 67 Cal. 2d at 862, 434 P .2d at 364, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 108. 
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this procedure will offer little protection to defendants if the court, 
in determining whether a defense was meaningful, insists that the 
defense and admission be consistent with each other. In People v. 
Shepard,77 for example, the defendant's three conflicting admissions, 
all obtained without the Escobedo warnings, were introduced at 
trial to demonstrate the defendant's consciousness of guilt and his 
ownership of the gun that, after two previous denials, he finally 
admitted owning in the third admission. In determining that the 
error in receiving the admissions in evidence was harmless, the court 
first reasoned that if the jury had believed the defendant's alibi 
witness, it would not have had to concern itself with the conflicting 
admissions. Apparently, the court did not consider that the witness' 
credibility may have been affected by the conflicting admissions. 
Second, the court found that defendant's admission that he owned 
the gun was consistent with his subsequent defense. The court stated: 
Nor was the story told at the trial induced by the original denial of 
ownership; the final version was impelled by the testimony that de-
fendant owned the gun-a fact which the police would and could 
have developed even if defendant had exercised his right to remain 
silent.78 
Thus, the court not only admitted that the defendant's admissions 
"impelled" his defense, but also assumed and stated that the admis-
sion was true, even though it was never proven at trial. 
IV. OBSERVATIONS 
While the California approach demands automatic reversal when 
confessions obtained in violation of Miranda are introduced at trial, 
and therefore represents a more moderate approach than that taken in 
those states that apply the harmless error rule to all Miranda viola-
tions, its distinction between admissions and confessions in applying 
the harmless error rule is illusory and untenable.79 As the Supreme 
Court said in Miranda, "The privilege against self-incrimination 
protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself 
in any manner; it does not distinguish degree of incrimination."80 
77. 250 Cal. App. 2d 736, 58 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1967). 
78. 250 Cal. App. 2d at 738, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 816. 
79. See R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 59-64 (1970), in which Justice 
Traynor, retired Chief Justice of the California supreme court, states that although he 
formerly supported the confession-admission distinction, he now views it with some 
reservation "in the light of additional reflection on the many post-Miranda problems 
that confront state courts." He argues, however, that an "appropriate"-albeit limited 
-harmless error test should be applied to both confessions and admissions. His method 
of determining the harmlessness of an error that involves the admission into evidence 
of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is to examine the nature and numb~r 
of issues that the statements resolve against the defendant. Id. at 59. 
80. 384 U.S. at 476. 
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Certainly a defendant's admission that he robbed and assaulted a 
victim81 or that he shot at police82 has as much influence on the trier 
of fact as does an actual confession of murder or intentional assault 
of a police officer. Also, there is no reason to doubt that coerced 
admissions are as unreliable as coerced confessions. 83 Yet, in California, 
the introduction of the latter into evidence will result in automatic 
reversal, whereas the introduction of the former will be susceptible 
to the harmless error rule.84 
More important than the above considerations, however, the 
California experience illustrates the extent to which the harmless 
error rule can nullify the force of Miranda in protecting a defen-
dant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The 
most flagrant abuses of Miranda, when embodied in admissions, will 
be tolerated so long as the amount of untainted evidence justifies the 
conviction. The problem remains, of course, to determine exactly 
what untainted evidence is and how much of this evidence is neces-
sary to justify a conviction. Instead of subjecting a defendant's con-
stitutional rights to analysis under this quantitative standard, it 
would seem more appropriate to insist on strict adherence to the dic-
tates of Miranda and to require automatic reversal if an inadmissible 
statement is introduced at trial. In this manner, the police will be 
deterred from violating the Miranda requirements, and the prosecu-
tors and trial courts, working under the stricture of automatic 
reversal, will be eager to guard against the introduction of any 
inadmissible statement. As a result, the frequency of error will be 
diminished and a savings of judicial resources can be effected. This 
argument is reinforced by the fact that the Miranda warnings can be 
given with a minimum of difficulty,86 and while the exact dimensions 
of that decision are as yet unclear,86 there would seem to be little 
administrative cost in possible over-protection. Thus, the Miranda 
warnings should be given whenever there is any possibility that the 
interview could be termed "custodial interrogation." Moreover, the 
police should insist upon an explicit waiver, and all interrogation 
should cease once an accused expresses that desire. Adherence to 
this strict procedure will result in the admissibility of any significant 
statement, and the procedure itself is consistent with our tradition as 
an accusatorial, not inquisitorial, system.8'1 
Bl. See text accompanying notes 52-58 supra. 
82. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra. 
83, See note 54 supra. 
84. Id. 
85. 884 U.S. at 488-86. But see Justice White's dissenting opinion in Miranda, 884 
U.S. at 584-86. 
86. See Orozco v. Texas, 894 U.S. 824 (1969). 
87. 884 U.S. at 460. 
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It has been argued that automatic reversal is especially appropri-
ate when illegally obtained confessions are introduced because of the 
certainty that the confession will so permeate the proceeding that any 
effective defense is impossible.88 Thus, to fashion a harmless error 
rule based entirely on those few cases in which prejudice will not be 
found would result in a greater expenditure of judicial resources 
because of the necessity of proving prejudice in the vast majority of 
cases in which it would otherwise be legitimately presumed.89 
It is possible that a rule of automatic reversal would have to 
make an exception for those cases involving either multiple confes-
sions-in which the defendant's first confession was obtained in 
complete compliance with constitutional requirements while subse-
quent confessions were not, and yet all were admitted into evidence 
--or multiple admissions-in which the defendant made precisely 
the same admission more than once, but only the first admission was 
elicited constitutionally. Such an exception would be necessary be-
cause it is not yet clear that repeated Miranda warnings are necessary 
each time a statement is elicited.90 Therefore, there may be no error 
at all if the proper warnings were given to the defendant initially. 
Moreover, the degree of prejudice resulting from the introduction of 
the second statement would necessarily be slight since the fact-finders 
would have the same information before them in the error-free intro-
duction of the first statement.91 Thus, the existence of such a narrow 
exception to a rule of automatic reversal would probably not result 
in an undermining of the Miranda protections, as is the case under 
the harmless error rule. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The lessons learned under California's experience with the 
harmless error rule reinforce the conclusion that a rule of automatic 
reversal is needed to ensure that the requirements of Miranda are 
fully complied with. The lack of effective control by the Supreme 
Court over the state courts' application of the inherently subjective 
88. Mause, supra note 2, at 543. 
89. Id. 
90. See Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968); Miller v. United 
States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1968); Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 888 (1967); People v. Hill, 39 Ill. 2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 367 (1968); 
State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352, 245 A.2d 339 (1968). See also note 46 supra. 
91. Similarly, it is arguable that the actual prejudice to the defendant at trial may 
not be great in the situation where the first statement is elicited in violation of 
Miranda but subsequent statements are obtained in compliance with the requirements 
of that case. However, because the initial statement has such 3: high likelihood of 
pressuring the accused to give the subsequent statements-thereby prejudicing him by 
drawing forth an otherwise constitutionally valid and admissible statement-all the 
statements should be excluded to encourage the police to comply with the dictates of 
Miranda. 
April 1971] Notes 957 
overwhelming-evidence standard must be recognized. The Court 
would, of necessity, have to engage in extensive review of trial court 
proceedings in order to control even the most flagrant misapplica-
tions of that standard, and it seems unlikely that the Court has either 
the time or the inclination to oversee the trial courts in such a 
manner. This lack of effective control by the Court is especially 
dangerous in cases involving Miranda violations because of the low 
regard in which the Miranda safeguards are held generally,92 and 
specifically in the state courts.93 Thus, a rule of automatic reversal 
seems to be both the appropriate and necessary solution if the pro-
tections and general viability of Miranda are to be retained. 
92. See title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 8501 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), which, in effect, overrules the Miranda decision. 
98. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364 (1969). Indeed, the 
Supreme Court itself may be cutting back on its enthusiastic endorsement of the 
principles of Miranda. See Harris v. New York, 39 U.S.L.W. 4281 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1971). 
